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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-3(2)(d) and (f)
(1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Was the Judge correct in insisting on going ahead with the trial, even though

there was substantial evidence that the parties may have had some confusion about the time
of trial, and whether it was a trial or pretrial conference?
B.

Was the Defendant denied fundamental fairness as required by the Utah and

U.S. Constitutions?
C.

Did the prosecution present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant

was indeed guilty of the crime of stalking?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is that, if the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact are erroneous or clearly erroneous, said Findings of Fact should be set aside. U.R.C.P.
52(a); State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d 932.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
5.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
a.

The City of Orem alleges that the Defendant committed the of the crime

of stalking by seeing or attempting to contact the Victim, Charlotte McKinley, after being
told that she no longer wanted to see him.
b.

The case was unable to be resolved at pretrial, so the matter was set for

1

trial. The Defendant did not appear for the trial, and claims that, because of problems with
his roommates disposing of his mail, he did not receive notice of the trial date from his
attorney.
c.

At the trial, the Victim testified that on several occasions the Defendant

came to her place of work. On many occasions, she had to go to the back of the store and
have other employees cover while she waited for the Defendant to leave because she did not
want to see him. She further testified that she and Defendant had never had any kind of
relationship, and that the Defendant's advances were unwanted. Defendant also contacted
her in the parking lot when she was getting out of class at school. Because of the repeated
attempts to contact her, she finally called the police and reported the situation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant failed to appear at the trial; at sentencing, Defendant informed the Court
that his roommates sometimes threw his mail away rather than give it to him, so he did not
receive the notice of the trial. Because the Court refused to continue the trial, Defendant was
denied substantial fairness guaranteed under the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. Further,
Defendant had evidence to present that would have contradicted some of the testimony of the
victim, but because the Court refused to continue the trial, or to grant a new trial, Defendant
was able to present his evidence.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE PROSECUTION PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF STALKING?
It is well-established law in Utah as well as other jurisdictions that, in order to convict
a defendant of a crime, the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
specific elements of the crime of retail theft which must be proven by the prosecution, and
which are at issue here, are outlined in §76-5-106.5(2), U.C.A. (1953), as amended:
A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family;
or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate
family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person :
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family
will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family;
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his
immediate family.
In the present case, the victim testified that she was very much afraid of Defendant
and the attention he was giving to her. However, because Defendant did not appear at his
trial, he was not able to produce the evidence he had that would have shown that the
relationship between Defendant and the victim was much more extensive than the victim was
3

willing to admit at the trial. Had the Defendant been able to testify at the trial, he could have
shown that the victim had actually called him on his cell phone, not just once, but many
times. Because the Defendant was not able to present his evidence, the Court could not
effectively decide whether the City had proven Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
as is required under the Constitution.
POINT II
WAS THE JUDGE CORRECT IN INSISTING ON GOING AHEAD WITH
THE TRIAL EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
THE PARTIES MAY HAVE HAD SOME CONFUSION ABOUT THE TIME OF
TRIAL, AND WHETHER IT WAS A TRIAL OR PRETRIAL CONFERENCE?
On several occasions, both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have addressed the
issue of when a trial court should grant a continuance of a trial. In almost every case, both
courts have held that this decision is within the discretion of the trial court. In State v.
Featherstone. 781 P. 2d 424, 431, (UT 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "In order to
constitute reversible error, the error complained of must be sufficiently prejudicial that thee
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its absence."
More recently, this Court has also addressed this issue. This case involved a
defendant whose request for a continuance of the trial was denied by the trial court, but later
reversed by this court. The ruling held in part "Tolano's right to a fair trial outweighed any
inconvenience to the court, the opposing party, and the jury that may have been caused by
a continuance." State v. Tolane, 19 P.3d 400,403 (Ut App. 2001). The court continued in
stating that although inconvenience was one factor to consider in determining whether a
4

continuance was warranted, it was only one factor, and would not outweigh the Defendant's
right to a fair trial. More importantly for the present case, this court went on to state as
follows: "the final factor-the extent to which Tolano might have suffered harm as a result
of the court's denial-is the 'most important among the factors."5 Id. At 404. The decision
also cited State v. Aurellano. 964 P. 2d 1167 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), stating 'Therefore, to
establish that the prosecution's error was not prejudicial, the State must persuade the court
that there is no reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecution's error, the outcome would
have been more favorable for defendant." Id. At 1171.
Applying the standards set by the above two cases, the court should have continued
the trial when the defendant did not appear, as requested by counsel. Very clearly, Defendant
was prejudiced by not being able to testify and defend himself at trial. There were very few
witnesses who would have been inconvenienced by continuing the trial, or granting a new
trial, and according to the above cases, Defendant's Constitutional right to appear and defend
himself outweighs any inconvenience incurred by the witnesses or the Court in granting a
continuance or new trial.
POINT III
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AS REQUIRED BY
THE UTAH AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS?
One of the most basic rights guaranteed under the Constitution is that of fundamental
fairness. "The essential requirement exacted of the states by the due process clause of the
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Fourteenth amendment... is that the trial shall be fair." 21 Am. Jur. 2d5 Criminal Law §647.
Such due process rights require that the Defendant, at a minimum, have an opportunity to
examine adverse witnesses. Id. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that the
due process clause unquestionably guarantees to the defendant a right to rebut the case
proved against him, and this right in turn includes the right ton cross-examine witnesses who
testify on behalf of the state. U.S. vs. Grande. 620 F. 2d 1026 (CA4,1980).
In the present case, Defendant did not appear at trial, but was able to explain at his
sentencing that he believed that his roommates had not given to him the letter notifying him
of his court date. The right to appear and defend onself against one's accusers is, as noted
above, a basic, fundamental right. It is of such importance that the trial court should have
allowed the Defendant to continue the trial, or at the very least, granted a new trial. Failure
to do either violated Defendant's right to fundamental fairness in the proceedings below.
SUMMARY
The City did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of the
crime of stalking, and the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant to
Defendant a continuance or a new trial.
DATED this 7th day of February, 2003.

kandy M. Tish
Attorney for Defendant
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I hereby certify that on the 7th day of February, 2003,1 mailed a true and correct copy
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